John Perry states the argument as follows: "…even if we identify experiences with brain states, there is still the question of what makes the brain state an experience, and the experience it is; it seems like that must be an additional property the brain state has…There must be a property that serves as our mode of presentation of the experience as an experience... " (p.101) . Later in discussing the Knowledge Argument, Perry considers Frank Jackson's famous future neuroscientist Mary who is raised in a black and white room (which Perry calls the Jackson Room) and learns all that anyone can learn about the scientific nature of the experience of red without ever seeing anything red. While in the room, Mary uses the term 'Q R ' for the sensation of red, a sensation whose neurological character she thinks she understands but has never herself had. Perry says: "If told the knowledge argument, Black "might say, 'But then isn't there something about Q R that Mary didn't learn in the Jackson room, that explains the difference between 'Q R is Q R ' which she already knew in the Jackson room, and (5) [(5)= Q R is this subjective character], which she didn't?' There must be a new mode of presentation of that state to which 'Q R ' refers, which is to say some additional and apparently nonphysical aspect of that state, that she learned about only when she exited the room, that explains why (5) is new knowledge." (p. 101) 2 As I read him, Perry uses 'mode of presentation' here to denote a property of the referent (rather than anything cognitive or semantic or linguistic), and he sees Black's problem as arising from the question of the physicality of the mode of presentation in that sense of the term. Smart speaks in the same spirit of a property that pins down one half of the identification. 'Mode of presentation' is often used to refer to something other than a property, but on this idea of the Property Dualism Argument, it is used to refer to a property.
The version of the Property Dualism I wish to critique follows a line of thought common to Smart and Perry. Before I can state it, I will have to introduce some machinery. Consider a specific type of phenomenal feel, Q, e.g. the feel of the pain I am having right now. (If pain just is a type of feel, then Q is just pain.) Q is a property. We 2 Part of what Smart says is hard to interpret. I left out a crucial phrase in the Smart quotation that seems confused to me. What I left out is the underlined phrase in the following: "the objection that a sensation can be identified with a brain process only if it has some phenomenal property, not possessed by brain processes, whereby one-half of the identification may be, so to speak, pinned down…" The underlined phrase is puzzling since Smart gives every indication of thinking that the threat from Max Black's objection is from a dual aspect theory that says that token pains are token brain states, but that the token pains have irreducible phenomenal properties. The dualism is supposed to derive from the non-physicality of the phenomenal property, not the phenomenal property failing to apply to the brain processes. Perry explicitly avoids Smart's error when he says: "…even if we identify experiences with brain states, there is still the question of what makes the brain state an experience, and the experience it is; it seems like that must be an additional property the brain state has…" could think of it either as a property of a person or as a property of a token pain, or as a type of pain if that is something different. The physicalist says, let us suppose, that Q = cortico-thalamic oscillation of such and such a kind. (Using this as a paradigm phenomenal-physical identity claim in this paper, I will drop the last six words.) This is an a posteriori claim. Thus the identity depends on the expressions on either side of the '=' expressing distinct concepts, for if the concepts were the same, it is said, the identity would be a priori.
. 'Q' in my terminology is very different from 'Q R ' in Perry's terminology since 'Q R ' is a term that Mary understands in the black and white room. 'Q' by contrast is meant as the verbal expression of a phenomenal concept. A phenomenal concept of the experience of red (or, alternatively, of the color red) is what Mary lacked in the black and white room and what she gained when she went outside of it. (I don't think Perry would disagree.) It is important to note that Q must be referred to under a phenomenal concept of it for the Property Dualism Argument to even get off the ground. Suppose that in the original identity claim we allowed any old concept of Q--e.g. "the property whose onset of instantiation here was at 5 PM" or "the property whose instantiation causes the noise "ouch"". There is no special problem having to do with phenomenality for the physicalist about the properties in virtue of which such concepts could pick out the phenomenal feel. That is, the modes of presentation of these properties raise no issues of the metaphysical status of phenomenality. If the original paradigm of phenomenal/physical identity were "the property whose onset of instantiation here was at 5 PM = cortico-thalamic oscillation", the mode of presentation of the left hand side would not be a special candidate for non-physicality. It would be the property of being instantiated here starting at 5 PM. The Property Dualism Argument depends on an identity in which a phenomenal concept is involved on the mental side. To allow a non-phenomenal concept is to discuss an argument that has only a superficial resemblance to the Property Dualism Argument. What is a phenomenal concept? A phenomenal concept is or involves a phenomenal way of thinking. But what is that? I will say more later, but for now let me say that a phenomenal way of thinking involves an occurrence of a phenomenal property, for example, in an occurrent experiential state, perception or image. The idea is that this token event or state is used in the concept to pick out a phenomenal property (a type). This picture of phenomenal concepts has its origins in Loar (1990/97) ; a version that is closer to what I have in mind is spelled out in Papineau (2002); a related account appears in Chalmers (2002) and in an unpublished paper by Kati Balog. (A briefer account along the same lines appears in Block (2002)). Of course it is a matter of stipulation what one chooses to call a "phenomenal concept". In particular, one can be looser and more relaxed about the requirement of an occurrent phenomenal state, allowing, for example, phenomenal concepts that bring in occurrent phenomenal elements only dispositionally. The rationale for thinking of phenomenal concepts in the less relaxed way I am suggesting lies in their role in the Property Dualism Argument. What motivates the Property Dualist's idea that mind-body identities are self-defeating is that the mental concepts involved in stating them require unreduced phenomenality, and that idea is best accommodated by requiring that the mental term of the identity involve a phenomenal concept in my sense. I will be returning to the need for a phenomenal concept in the Property Dualism Argument repeatedly, since as we will see, some putative refutations of the Property Dualism Argument fail because of it.
Modes of Presentation
I follow some unpublished papers by Stephen White 3 in taking the Property Dualism Argument to involve two different notions of a mode of presentation, the cognitive mode of presentation (CMoP) and the metaphysical mode of presentation (MMoP) . (These are my terms, not White's, and one of the issues between us is the nature of CMoPs and MMoPs.) The difference is that the CMoP is something semantic or mental or linguistic, perhaps a meaning or a mental representation, whereas the MMoP is a property of the referent. (Or, confusingly, the referent itself in some cases in which the referent is itself a property). The CMoP is more in the ballpark of what philosophers have tended to take modes of presentation to be, and the various versions of what a CMoP might be are also as good candidates as any for what a concept might be. The MMoP is less often thought of as a mode of presentation-perhaps the most salient example is certain treatments of the causal theory of reference in which a causal relation to the referent is thought of as a mode of presentation. (Devitt, 19xx) Physicalists say that everything is physical and thus they are committed to the claim that everything cognitive, linguistic and semantic is physical. However, not all issues for physicalism can be discussed at once, and since the topic of this paper is the difficulty for physicalism posed by phenomenality, I propose to assume that the cognitive, linguistic and semantic features of CMoPs do not pose a problem for physicalism so long as they do not involve anything phenomenal.
I don't know that there is much need for the distinction between CMoP and MMoP outside of discussions involving the Property Dualism Argument, but the distinction does make sense in other contexts. For example, consider the CMoP associated with "the morning star". The CMoP has a role in picking out the referent, but it works via some properties of the referent rather than others. In particular, the referent it picked out in virtue of the referent's property (the MMoP) of rising in the morning rather than its property of being covered with clouds or having a surface temperature of 847 degrees Fahrenheit.
Since there are so many different items that answer to "mode of presentation", an obvious question is "What is it for?" Quite different answers to that question that play some role in the Property Dualism Argument are: (1) accounting for cognitive significance and (2) fixing the referent. In addition, the question arises as to whether (3) the CMoP provides a priori access to the referent or has an a priori relation of some other sort to the MMoP. I very much doubt that there is any CMoP/MMoP pair that has all three of those properties. Alex Byrne and Jim Pryor (2004) give straightforward counterexamples to most of these relations (albeit in somewhat different terms from the ones used here), but I will not bring in their counterexamples except in one case. I will argue that the key step in the Property Dualism Argument can be justified in a number of ways, assuming rather different ideas of what MMoPs and CMoPs are (so there is really a family of Property Dualism Arguments). I will start with a notion of CMoP and MMoP geared to cognitive significance. I will not assume that the CMoP and MMoP in this sense also fix reference or that there is an a priori relation between CMoP and MMoP. Then when I move to criticizing the Property Dualism Argument, I will bring in the criterion of fixing the referent and an a priori relation between CMoP and MMoP. There are many interesting and controversial issues about how to choose from various rather different ways of fleshing out notions of CMoP and MMoP. My strategy will be to try to avoid these interesting and controversial issues, sticking with the bare minimum needed to state and critique the Property Dualism Argument. The issue arises as to whether there is a 1-1 correspondence between CMoP and MMoP. Can there be an identity statement with two cognitive modes (CMoPs) and one metaphysical mode (MMoP) or vice versa? Prima facie, it seems that both can happen. Consider the identity 'the thing in the corner covered with water = the thing in the corner covered with H 2 O'. We can take the CMoP associated with the left hand side of the identity statement to be the description 'the thing in the corner covered with water' plus its meaning, and the corresponding MMoP to be the property of being the thing in the corner covered with water. Analogously for the right hand side. But the property of being the thing in the corner covered with water = the property of being the thing in the corner covered with H 2 O. MMoP 1 =MMoP 2 , i.e. there is only one MMoP, even though here are two CMoPs.
Of course, a theorist who wishes to see MMoPs as shadows of CMoPs can postulate different, more fine-grained quasi-linguistic-cognitive MMoPs that are 4 Suppose that someone rationally believes that he is seeing Hesperus but not Phosphorus. The subject is in an epistemic situation qualitatively like one he would be in in a world in which there are two heavenly bodies, each of which manifests one but not the other of two MMoPs. One can contrast two ways of filling this idea out, two stances one might take in explaining the error in terms of MMoPs. First, one could stick with properties such as rising in the morning and rising in the evening, which Hesperus has at all times but manifests at different times. The explanation of error would be that the subject is in an epistemic situation in which he observes the manifestation of one property and the lack of manifestation of the other and infers that that there are two distinct objects, each of which has one but not the other property. The second stance one might take is to think of the MMoPs not as the observer-independent properties, rising in the morning and rising in the evening, but rather as manifesting rising in the morning and manifesting rising in the evening. These are naturally taken to be indexical properties since Hesperus manifests one at one time and the other at other times. When the topic arises, I will use the first non-indexical strategy. individuated according to the CMoPs. Perhaps the more fine-grained MMoPs could be justified by appeal to an a priori relation between CMoP and MMoP. I will return to the issue of MMoPs individuated according to CMoPs later in rebutting the Property Dualism Argument.
For reasons that will appear, I will mention a different type of example of one CMoP with two MMoPs.
Consider the example of 'Paderewski= Paderewski', which can be informative to someone who has two uses of 'Paderewski' which he takes to denote different people but which actually denote one person. We could imagine that the subject has forgotten where he learned the two words and remembers nothing about one Paderewski that distinguishes him from the other. If asked, he may say that there are two Paderewskis, and that he knows nothing about one that is any different from what he knows about the other. Someone might argue that the semantic properties of the two uses of 'Paderewski' are the same. For the referent is the same and every property associated by the subject with these terms is the same. (Say he remembers that Paderewski in both uses is famous, male, European, living and that he heard about him from a friend.) Still, famously, one can imagine rational error of the Fregean kind. We could give a name to the relevant cognitive difference by saying that the subject has two "mental files" corresponding to the two uses of 'Paderewski'. We could regard the difference in mental files as a semantic difference, or we could suppose that semantically the two uses of 'Paderewski' are the same, but that there is a need for something more than semantics in individuating CMoPs. In either case, there are two CMoPs.
As Loar (19xx) notes, Paderewski type situations can arise for general terms, even in situations where the subject associates the same description with the two uses of the general term. An English speaker learns the term 'chat' from a monolingual French speaker who exhibits cats, and then is taught the term 'chat' again by the same forgetful teacher exhibiting the same cats. The student tacitly supposes that there are two senses of 'chat' which refer to creatures that are different in some respect that is not revealed in the way they look and act. Then the student forgets all the specific facts about the learning of the two words except that he continues to tacitly suppose that things that fit 'chat' in one sense do not fit it in the other. We can imagine that the student retains two separate mental files for 'chat', each of which says that chats in that sense are not the same as chats in the other. So if he learns 'this chat = this chat' where the first 'chat' is one use and the second is the other, that will be informative. It is certainly plausible that there are different CMoPs, given that there are two mental files. But the MMoP associated with both CMoPs would seem to be the same-something to do with the appearance of the chats the student has seen, being called 'chat', and the like. As before, those who prefer to see MMoPs as shadows of CMoPs can think of the property of being a chat in use 1 as distinct from the property of being a chat in use 2.
What about the converse-one CMoP, two MMoPs? People often use one mental representation very differently in different circumstances without having any awareness of the difference. Aristotle famously used the Greek word we translate with 'velocity' ambiguously, to denote instantaneous velocity and average velocity. He did not appear to see the difference. And the Florentine "Experimenters" of the 17 th Century used 'degree of heat' ambiguously to denote heat and the very different magnitude, temperature. Some of their measuring procedures for detecting "degree of heat" measured heat and some measured temperature. For example, one test of the magnitude of "degree of heat" was whether a given object would melt paraffin. This test measured whether the temperature was above the melting point of paraffin. Another test was the amount of ice an object would melt. This measured amount of heat, a very different magnitude. One could treat these cases as one CMoP which refers via different MMoPs, depending on context. Alternatively, one could treat the difference in context determining the difference in CMoP, preserving the 1-1 correspondence. This strategy would postulate a CMoP difference that was not available from the first person, imposed on the basis of a difference in the world.
Back to Stating the Property Dualism Argument
To frame the Property Dualism Argument, we need to use a contrast between deflationism and phenomenal realism about consciousness. Phenomenal realism is inevitably called "inflationism", even by supporters of inflationism, given that we lack a single term that means neither inflated nor deflated; though "just-right-ism" has a preferable meaning. 5 In its strong form, deflationism is conceptual reductionism concerning concepts of consciousness. More generally, deflationism says that a priori or at least armchair analyses of consciousness (or at least armchair sufficient conditions) can be given in non-phenomenal terms, most prominently in terms of representation, thought or function. 6 (If the analyses are physicalistic, then deflationism is a form of what Chalmers calls Type A physicalism.) The rationale for the terminology can be seen by comparing eliminativism and deflationism. The eliminativist says phenomenal properties and states do not exist. The deflationist says phenomenal properties and states do exist, 5 Deflationism with respect to truth is the view that the utility of the concept of truth can be explained disquotationally and that there can be no scientific reduction of truth. (Paul Horwich, Truth, Blackwell: Oxford, 1990 . Second edition 1998, Oxford University Press: Oxford; Hartry Field, "Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content", Mind 103, 1994: 249-285.) Deflationism with respect to consciousness in its most influential form is, confusingly, a kind of reductionismalbeit armchair reductionism rather than substantive scientific reductionism--and thus the terminology I am following can be misleading. I may have introduced this confusing terminology (in my 1992 reply to Dennett and Kinsbourne, reprinted in Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere, op.cit., p. 177; and also in my review of Dennett in The Journal of Philosophy, p. 181-93, 1993.) , and though it is both confusing and misleading, it has already taken firm hold, and so I will use it here. 6 Why "a priori or armchair"? Many philosophers adopt forms of functionalism, representationism or cognitivism that, it would seem, could only be justified by conceptual analysis, while nonetheless rejecting a priority.
but that commitment is "deflated" by an armchair analysis that reduces the commitment. The conclusion of the Property Dualism Argument is that physicalism and phenomenal realism ("inflationism") are incompatible: the phenomenal realist ("inflationist") must be a dualist and that the physicalist must be a deflationist.
The Property Dualism Argument in the form in which I will elaborate it depends on listing all the leading candidates for the nature of the MMoP of the mental side. (I will also examine CMoPs later.) Recall that the phenomenal side of the identity is 'Q'.
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Let the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q be M (for mental, metaphysical and mode of presentation. The basic idea of the Property Dualism Argument is that even if Q is physical, there is a problem about the physicality of M. I will discuss five proposals for the nature of M. M might be (one or more of)
(1) mental, (2) physical, (3) non-physical, (4) topic-neutral or (5) non-existent, i.e. the reference is "direct" in one sense of the term.
Here is a brief summary of the form of the argument. (1) is correct but useless, since the physicalist has to show he can adopt it. (2) is (supposed to be) ruled out by the arguments given below. This is where the action is. (5) changes the subject by stipulating a version of the original property identity 'Q=cortico-thalamic oscillation' in which Q is not picked out by a genuine phenomenal concept. So the remaining options are the dualist option (3), and the topic-neutral option (4). White (1983) argues that (4) is deflationist as follows: The topic-neutral properties that are relevant to the mind-body problem are functional properties. If M, the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q, is a topic-neutral and therefore functional property, then that could only be because the phenomenal concept has an a priori functional analysis. E.g. the concept of pain might be the concept of a state that is caused by tissue damage and that causes certain reactions including interactions with other mental states. But an a priori functional analysis is deflationist, by definition. The upshot is that only (3) and (4) remain; (3) is dualist and (4) is deflationist. The conclusion is that we must choose between dualism and deflationism: inflationist physicalism is not tenable.
Of course the argument as I have presented it makes the title "Property Dualism Argument" look misguided. Anyone who does take the argument to argue for dualism would presumably want to add an argument against deflationism. However, historically, that is not how the argument has been used. The dualism has come in as a threat that can only be avoided by going deflationist. Smart and David Armstrong (with a more convoluted variant by David Lewis) take the topic-neutral analyses to justify a doctrine they describe as contingent physicalism. Their view is that 'pain' contingently picks out a physical state, for 'pain' is a non-rigid designator whose sense is the item with such and such functional role. But the view that stands behind this picture is that the nature of the mental is given a priori as functional. 'Pain' is a non-rigid designator, but what it is to have pain, that which cases of pain all share in virtue of which they are pains, is a certain functional property, and that functional property can be rigidly designated by, for example, the phrase 'having pain'.
8 So the view is a version of deflationism.
White (1983) used the Property Dualism Argument in pursuit of deflationism but in some papers in preparation (White (unpublished a,b ), White uses it to argue for dualism. The point of view of this paper is phenomenal realist (inflationist) and physicalist, the very combination that the argument purports to rule out. (Though see Block (2002) for a different kind of doubt about this combination.) As we will see when I get to the critique of the Property Dualism Argument, the argument fares better as an argument for dualism than for deflationism, so the name of the argument is appropriate.
Before I can go into the argument in more detail, I must say something about what a physical property, a mental property, etc., are supposed to be. As Hempel (19xx) noted, physicalism has a serious problem of obscurity. Physicalism about properties could be put as: all properties are physical. But what is a physical property? Hempel noted a dilemma (that has been further elaborated by Chomsky, 19xx)): Horn 1 is: we tie physicalism to current physics, in which case physicalism is unfairly judged false, since there are no doubt physical entities and properties which are not countenanced by current physics. These entities and properties would be counted as non-physical by this criterion, even if the physics of next week will unproblematically acknowledge them. Horn 2 is: we define physicalism in terms of future physics. But what counts as physics? We cannot take physics as given in an inquiry about whether physicalism can be unproblematically defined. And we surely don't want to count as physics whatever is done in academic departments called 'Physics Departments'. For if theologians hijacked the name 'Physics', that would not make God physical.
But not all philosophy concerned with physicalism can be about the problem of how to formulate physicalism. For some purposes, physicalism is clear enough.
9 In 8 The rationale for the functionalist understanding of this point of view is spelled out in Block, 1980 and in more streamlined form in Block, 1994a . Lewis, 1980 adopts a more complex mixture of functionalism and physicalism. 9 The big problem in defining physicalism is getting an acceptable notion of the physicalistically non-problematic without simply using the notion of the physical. One approach is to use a paradigm of the physicalistically unproblematic. I have suggested (1978) defining physicalism as the view that everything is decomposable into particles of the sort that make up inorganic matter. This definition uses "inorganic" as a way of specifying what is physicalistically unproblematic (following Feigl, 19xx) , and so would get the wrong result if the inorganic turns out to be physicalistically problematic, e.g. if pan-psychism obtains (electrons are conscious). Thus it fails as a sufficient condition of physicalism. It does not capture the meaning of 'physicalism' (and it does not even try to define 'physical property'), but it does better as a necessary condition of physicalism. See also Montero, 1999 . Papineau (2002 I will take the notions of physicalistic vocabulary and mentalistic vocabulary to be unproblematic. A physical property is a property canonically expressible in physicalistic vocabulary. For example, the property of being water is a physical property because that property = the property of being H 2 O. The predicate '___is H 2 0' is a predicate of physics (or anyway physical science), the property of being H 2 O is expressed by that predicate, and so is the property of being water, since they are the same property. A mentalistic property is a property canonically expressible in mentalistic vocabulary. A non-physical property is a property that is not canonically expressible in physicalistic vocabulary. (So physicalism dictates that mental properties are canonically expressible in both physicalistic and mentalistic vocabularies.)
Note that the relation of "expression" is distinct from referring. '___is a pain' is a mentalistic predicate and thus expresses (or connotes) a mental property (that of being a pain). By "expression", I mean what might be called canonical expression. The 'canonical' is intended to block certain predicates such as '__is instantiated at 5:00 PM' as showing that a mental property is physical. I don't know if this notion can ultimately be spelled out in a satisfactory manner, but this is another of the cluster of issues involved in defining physicalism that not every paper concerning physicalism can be about.
Smart said that a topic-neutral analysis of a property term entails neither that the property is physical nor that it is non-physical. It would not do to say that a topic-neutral property is expressible in neither physicalistic nor non-physicalistic terms, since if physicalistic terms and non-physicalistic terms are all the terms there are, there are no such properties. The key kind of topic-neutral property for present purposes is a functional property, a second order property that consists in the having of certain other properties that are related to one another (causally and otherwise) and to inputs and outputs, all specified non-mentalistically. One could say that a topic-neutral property is one that is expressible in terms of logic, causation and non-mentalistically specified specifying the physicalistically unproblematic by a list. He suggests defining physicalism as the thesis that everything is identifiable non-mentally, that is nonmental concepts can be used to pick out everything, including the mental. One problem with this way of proceeding is that "mental" has the same problem as "physical". We may one day acknowledge "mental" properties that we do not acknowledge today (much as Freudian unconscious mental properties are said to not always have been part of our conception of the mind). We can define the mental in terms of a list of currently acknowledged mental properties, which would be as problematic as defining the physical by a list. Or we could appeal to what will be recognized later as "mental", hitching our concept wrongly to the use of a term by future generations. If you think this is a merely hypothetical issue, note the controversies over unconscious inference in perception and unconscious cognitive processes in cognitive science more generally.
input-output language. Thus we must confront the issue of whether these terms are to be counted as part of physicalistic vocabulary or not. Not wanting to count functionalism as a kind of dualism, I will say that functional descriptions are physicalistic. But this terminological decision requires seeing the issue discussed below of whether the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q is physical as whether it is both physical and non-functional I will briefly sketch each of the proposals mentioned above for the nature of M (the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q, which you recall was introduced in the sample identity, Q = cortico-thalamic oscillation) from the point of view of the Property Dualism Argument, adding some critical comments at a few places. Then, after a section on phenomenal concepts, I will rebut the Property Dualism Argument.
Proposal 1: M is mental.
If M is mental, then the same issue of physicalism arises for M, the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q, that arises for Q itself. So from the point of view of the Property Dualism Argument, we have gotten nowhere. It isn't that this proposal is false, but rather that it presents a challenge to the physicalist of showing how it could be true.
Proposal 2. M is physical.
The heart of the Property Dualism Argument is the claim that M cannot be physical. (As explained three paragraphs ago, this is the issue of whether M is physical without being functional. Recall that according to White (1983) , if M is functional, that could only be because the phenomenal concept has an a priori functional analysis, which would be deflationist. The step under consideration is that M cannot be physical if inflationism is true.) White (1983), expresses a view that strikes a chord when he says "Since there is no physicalistic description that one could plausibly suppose is coreferential a priori with an expression like "Smith's pain at t," no physical property of a pain (i.e., a brain state of type X) could provide the route by which it was picked out by such an expression." (p. 353 of the original publication and p. 706 of the reprinted version in Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere, 1997) . Or in the terms of this paper, there is no physicalistic description that one could plausibly suppose is coreferential a priori with a mentalistic expression such as 'Q', so no physical property could provide the route by which it was picked out by such an expression. The property that provides the route by which Q is picked out by 'Q' is just the metaphysical mode of presentation (on one way of understanding that term) of Q, that is, M. So the upshot is supposed to be that M cannot be physical because there is no physicalistic description that is coreferential a priori with a phenomenal term.
Here is a second argument against the physical option.
10 If M is physical, it will not serve to account for cognitive significance. For example, suppose the subject rationally believes that Q is instantiated here and now but that cortico-thalamic oscillation is absent. He experiences Q, but also has evidence (misleading evidence, according to the physicalist) that cortico-thalamic oscillation is absent. We can explain rational error by appeal to two different MMoPs of the referent, only one of which is manifest. Let us take the metaphysical mode of presentation of the right hand side to be a matter of the instrumentation that detects cortico-thalamic oscillation. We can think of this instrumentation as keyed to the oxygen uptake by neural activity. (Functional magnetic resonance is a form of brain imaging that detects brain activity via sensitivity to metabolism of the oxygen that feeds brain activity.) The focus of this argument is the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q, namely M. According to the argument, if M is physical, it cannot serve the purpose of explaining rational error. For, according to this argument, to explain rational error, we require a metaphysical mode of presentation that makes rational sense of the subject's point of view. But the physical nature of M is not available to the subject, ex hypothesi. (The subject can be presumed to know nothing of the physical nature of M.) The problem could be solved if there was a mental mode of presentation of M itself, call it "M*". But this is the first step in a regress in which a physical metaphysical mode of presentation is itself presented by a mental metaphysical mode of presentation. For the same issue will arise all over again for M* that arose for M. Explaining rational error requires two modes of presentation the manifestation of which are available to the first person at some level or other, so postulating a physical metaphysical mode of presentation just takes out an explanatory loan that has to be paid back at the level of modes of presentation of modes of presentation, etc. The upshot is that physical metaphysical modes of presentation do not pass the test imposed by the stipulated purpose of metaphysical modes of presentation.
There is also a related non-regress argument: if M is physical, a subject could believe he is experiencing Q, yet not believe he is in a state that has M. But there can be no epistemic gap of this sort between the metaphysical mode of presentation of a phenomenal property and the property itself.
A third argument against the physical proposal is that MMoPs must be "thin", in the sense of having no hidden essence. "Thick" properties include Putnamian natural kinds such as water. According to the Property Dualist, the explanatory purpose of MMoPs precludes thick properties serving as modes of presentation. For, it might be said, it is not all of a thick property that explains rational error but only an aspect of it. The same conclusion can be reached if one postulates that the MMoP is a priori available on the basis of the CMoP. Since hidden essences are never a priori available, hidden essences cannot be part of MMoPs.
Earlier I suggested that there could be cases of a single MMoP with two CMoPs. One example was the identity 'the thing in the corner covered with water = the thing in the corner covered with H 2 O'. The CMoP associated with the left hand side is the description 'the thing in the corner covered with water', and the corresponding MMoP is the property of being the thing in the corner covered with water. Analogously for the right hand side. But the property of being the thing in the corner covered with water = the property of being the thing in the corner covered with H 2 O, so there is only one MMoP. But if MMoPs cannot be "thick", being covered with water cannot be an MMoP. The relevant MMoP would have to be some sort of stripped down version of being covered with water that does not have a hidden essence.
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These three arguments are the heart of the Property Dualism Argument. I regard them as appealing to MMoPs in somewhat different senses of the term, and when I come to critiquing these three arguments later in the paper, I will make that point more explicitly.
Proposal 3. M is non-physical.
If M is non-physical, dualism is true. So this proposal will not preserve the compatibility of phenomenal realism with physicalism and will not be considered further here.
Proposal 4. M is topic-neutral. I will discuss this proposal at length with respect to Perry's view, so I will postpone it until after the next one which can be handled briefly.
Proposal 5. There is no M: the relation between 'Q' and its referent is "direct" in one sense of the term A phenomenal concept is a phenomenal way of thinking of a phenomenal property. Phenomenal properties can be thought about using other concepts of them, for example, the concept of the property occurring at 5 PM. As I keep mentioning, the Property Dualism Argument requires a phenomenal concept in my sense of the term, and so any interpretation of it that does without phenomenal concepts is just changing the subject. As I emphasized above, the conclusion of the Property Dualism Argument is that the MMoP of the phenomenal term in a phenomenal-physical identity is either functional or non-physical, so Proposal 5 will not do. Since phenomenal concepts exist, direct reference theorists must have some room for them even if they deny phenomenal concepts a semantic role.
However, although phenomenal concepts are often said to refer "directly", what this is often taken to mean in philosophy of mind discussions is not that there is no metaphysical mode of presentation, but rather that the metaphysical mode of presentation is a necessary property of the referent or is the referent itself. Loar (1990) says: "Given a normal background of cognitive capacities, certain recognitional or discriminative dispositions suffice for having specific recognitional concepts…A recognitional concept may involve the ability to class together, to discriminate, things that have a given objective property. Say that if a recognitional concept is related thus to a property, the property triggers applications of the concept. Then the property that triggers the concept is the semantic value or reference of the concept; the concept directly refers to the property, unmediated by a higher order reference-fixer".
12
Consider the view that a phenomenal concept is simply a recognitional concept understood as Loar suggests whose object is a phenomenal property that is a physical property. I don't know if this would count as a concept which has no metaphysical mode of presentation at all, but certainly it has no phenomenal metaphysical mode of presentation, and so is not a phenomenal concept in the sense required for the Property Dualism Argument. For one can imagine a case of totally unconscious triggering of a concept by a stimulus or by a brain state. As Loar notes, there could be an analog of "blindsight" in which a self-directed recognitional concept is triggered blankly, without any phenomenal accompaniment. (Of course this need not be the case--the brain property doing the triggering could itself be phenomenal, or else the concept triggered could be phenomenal. In either case, phenomenality would have to be involved in the triggering of the concept.) And for this reason, Loar (1990, p. 98; 1997, p. 603 ) argues, a phenomenal concept is not merely a self-directed recognitional concept.
I will suggest later that a phenomenal concept can be construed as a way of thinking of a phenomenal property via itself. Such a concept could be thought of as a case of "direct" reference in one sense of the term, and the proponent of the Property Dualism Argument could not object to it on the ground of changing the subject.
M is topic-neutral:
Since Perry (2001) offers topic-neutrality as a response to Max Black's objection, I will focus this section on his view of the matter.
Here is Perry's (2001) response to Max Black's problem. 12 The quotation is from the 1990 version of Loar's "Phenomenal States", op.cit. p. 87. This picture is abandoned in the 1997 version of Loar's paper in which he retains talk of triggering and the direct reference terminology, but with a new meaning, namely: refers, but not via a non-contingent property of the referent. The view common to both the 1990 and 1997 paper is that a theoretical concept of, e.g. neuroscience might pick out a neurological property "that triggers a given recognitional concept, and so the two concepts can converge in their reference despite their cognitive independence…" (1990, p. 88) "We can now, by way of review, see how Black's dilemma is to be avoided. Let's return to our imagined physicalist discovery, as thought by Mary, attending to her sensation of a red tomato:
"This i sensation = B 52 " [where 'this i ' is an internal demonstrative and B 52 is a brain property that she already identified in the black and white room--NB] This is an informative identity; it involves two modes of presentation. One is the scientifically expressed property of being B 52 , with whatever structural, locational, compositional and other scientific properties are encoded in the scientific term. This is not a neutral concept. The other is being a sensation that is attended to by Mary. This is a neutral concept; if the identity is true, it is the neutral concept of a physical property. Thus, according to the antecedent physicalist [who takes physicalism as the default view--NB], Mary knows the brain state in two ways, as the scientifically described state and as the state that is playing a certain role in her life, the one she is having, and to which she is attending. The state has the properties that make it mental: there is something it is like to be in it and one can attend to it in the special way we have of attending to our own inner states." (2001, p. 205 ).
The concept specified by "being the sensation attended to by Mary" cannot be regarded as a topic-neutral concept unless the terms 'sensation' and 'attend' are themselves understood in a topic-neutral manner. For example, we might think of attention in purely information processing terms and of sensation in terms of energy impinging on the body's surfaces.
Construed in that way, "being the sensation attended to by Mary" requires no phenomenality-e.g. it could be a concept of a zombie--and is not a phenomenal concept in the sense required by the Property Dualism Argument. If Perry's suggestion is that we should solve Black's problem by substituting a topic-neutral demonstrative/recognitional concept for a phenomenal concept, it has the same problem as the "triggering" version of the direct reference view canvassed above-that it changes the subject by substituting a non-phenomenal concept for a phenomenal one. 13 13 I should register an item of evidence that I may be misinterpreting Perry. As I emphasized earlier, I interpret Perry as taking the Property Dualism Argument to concern the status of M, the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q, the property of Q in virtue of which the phenomenal term of the phenomenal/physical identity picks it out-or the referent itself on the account I will suggest later. He appears to opt for the topic-neutral option. But then he seems to shift to the topic-neutral option for the mode of presentation in the other sense of the term, the cognitive mode of presentation. The shift happens in the passage quoted above, in his use of the word 'concept'. "This is an informative identity; it involves two modes of presentation. One is the scientifically expressed property of being B 52 , with whatever structural, locational, compositional and other scientific properties are encoded in the scientific term. This is not a neutral concept. The other is being a sensation that is attended to by Mary. This is a neutral concept; I think that this is what the relevant part of Perry's proposal comes to, and so I think that it does not succeed as a defense against the Property Dualism Argument, but let me go a bit more slowly. Perry's book proposes the intriguing idea that a thought has a variety of "reflexive contents" that have the same truth conditions as the original thought. One reflexive content of my belief that Perry smokes is that the person who I am now thinking of is in the extension of the property that is the object of my concept of being a smoker. A mind-body identity claim like Mary's utterance of "This i sensation = B 52 " (where 'this i ' is an internal demonstrative) has as one of its reflexive contents that the sensation attended to by Mary has such and such scientifically specifiable properties. Perry emphasizes that the concepts in a reflexive content may not be ones that the subject actually has, but he argues persuasively that they may be psychologically relevant nonetheless if the subject is "attuned" to these concepts in reasoning and deciding. "Attunement and belief are different kinds of doxastic attitudes…" (107) Perry's solution to Max Black's problem and his reply to Jackson is to focus on a reflexive content that is topic-neutral. In the passage quoted earlier, he says what Mary learns is This i sensation is brain state B 52 .
The idea is that Mary is attuned to the reflexive content in which the concept expressed by "this i " is a topic-neutral demonstrative/recognitional concept. What Mary learns can be expressed in terms of something she is attuned to and Max Black's problem can be solved by appealing to attunement to the same topic-neutral concept.
Distinguish between two versions of Jackson's example. Sophisticated Mary acquires a genuine phenomenal concept when she sees red for the first time. Naive Mary is much less intellectual than Sophisticated Mary. Naïve Mary does not acquire a phenomenal concept when she sees red for the first time (just as a pigeon would not acquire a new concept on seeing red for the first time), nor does she acquire an explicit topic-neutral concept, but she is nonetheless attuned to certain topic-neutral nonphenomenal concepts of the sort Perry mentions. Perry's idea is that we can solve the Mary problem by (1) supposing what Mary learns is what Naïve Mary learns, namely a version of "This i sensation is brain state B 52 " that involves attunement to a topic-neutral concept rather than actual possession of it, and (2) the 'this i ' in the reflexive content is a topic-neutral concept.
if the identity is true, it is the neutral concept of a physical property." (The underlining is added by me.) The properties of being B 52 , and being a sensation that is attended to by Mary are said by Perry to be properties, but also concepts. The properties are modes of presentation in the metaphysical sense, but concepts are naturally taken to be or to involve modes of presentation in the cognitive sense. The view he actually argues for is: "We need instead the topicneutrality of demonstrative/recognitional concepts." (205) As I mentioned earlier, there is a well-known solution to the Mary problem that takes Mary as Sophisticated Mary. What Sophisticated Mary learns is a phenomenal concept of a physical property that she already had a physical concept of in the black and white room. Perry does not undercut this solution. But his solution is itself easily undercut by a Jacksonian opponent who shifts the thought-experiment from naive to sophisticated Mary. Consider this dialectic. Perry offers his solution. The Jacksonian opponent says "OK, maybe that avoids the problem of Naïve Mary, but the argument for dualism is revived if we consider a version of the thought experiment involving Sophisticated Mary, that is a version of the thought-experiment in which Mary actually acquires the phenomenal concept instead of merely being attuned to it. What Sophisticated Mary learns is a content that contains a genuine phenomenal concept. And that content was not available to her in the room. What she acquires is phenomenal knowledge (involving a phenomenal concept), knowledge that is not deducible from the physicalistic knowledge she had in the black and white room. So dualism is true." Perry cannot reply to this version of the thought experiment (involving Sophisticated Mary) by appealing to the other one (that involves Naïve Mary).
Chalmers (2002) argues that phenomenal concepts cannot be demonstrative concepts. The main argument could be put as follows: for any demonstrative concept, say 'this i ', this i has phenomenal property P would be news. But if the demonstrative concept was genuinely a phenomenal concept, there would be some claims of that form that are not news. I agree with the "not news" rule of thumb but not with the claim that there are no demonstrative concepts that are also phenomenal concepts. I think that one kind of phenomenal concept is both demonstrative and has a phenomenal MMoP, so it is not news to the person who picks out an experience using that MMoP that the experience has a certain phenomenal property. If I am right about this, the problem with Perry's proposal is not that he thinks of what Mary learns in terms of reflexive contents that are demonstrative, but rather that those demonstrative contents are non-phenomenal.
Let us now move to Perry's putative solution to the Max Black problem. Max Black's problem concerns the truth of a physicalist identity claim, which I have illustrated with 'Q= cortico-thalamic oscillation". The problem does not concern our relation to that (putative) truth-whether we are attuned to it or whether we actually believe it. The problem in brief is that if the physicalist identity is indeed true, the issue of the physicality of the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q, viz. M, arises. If M is non-physical, physicalism is defeated. And as I have emphasized, Max Black's problem does not even get off the ground unless the physicalist thesis 'Q= cortico-thalamic oscillation' is understood to involve a genuinely phenomenal concept of Q. Construing the physicalist identity thesis as not involving a genuine phenomenal concept is arguing against a straw man. Whether anyone is attuned to this genuinely phenomenal concept or actually possesses it is irrelevant to the logic of the argument. Possession of the phenomenal concept is required to state the physicalist claim that leads to the problem, but the problem for physicalism would be the same whether or not anyone had the concepts required to state the relevant physicalist thesis or the problem itself. In a world of monkeys who had phenomenal states but no ability to state physicalism about them, the Property Dualism Argument would show physicalism is false, if the argument is any good (and if deflationism is false). If the physicalist thesis-involving the genuinely phenomenal concept-is true, there is an issue about the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q under the genuinely phenomenal concept of it. So Perry's approach to the Property Dualism Argument changes the subject by substituting a topic-neutral demonstrative/recognitional concept for a phenomenal concept.
The proposal of reflexive contents that we are attuned to helps to illuminate these issues, but as far as I can see, it does not adequately rebut either Frank Jackson's argument for dualism or Max Black's.
Perry also applies his apparatus to the modal arguments for dualism such as Kripke's. Why do we have the illusion that "This i sensation = B 52 " is contingent, given that (according to physicalism) it is a metaphysically necessary truth? Perry's answer is that the necessary identity has some contingent reflexive contents such as: that the subjective character of red objects appears like so and so on an autocerebroscope, is called 'B 52 ', and is what I was referring to in my journal articles. This idea has some plausibility, but that plausibility begins to dissipate when one asks oneself "Couldn't I identify the brain state by its essential properties and still wonder whether I could have that brain state (so identified) without this i phenomenal property? It seems that the contingency that Perry was supposed to have explained away just reappears. More generally, the problem with Perry's approach to Kripke's problem is that it isn't enough to find some contingent reflexive contents for the necessary mind-body claim. What Perry must do is make it plausible that any justification for the claim of contingency depends on conflating reflexive contents with non-reflexive contents.
To sum up, the Property Dualism Argument says that in the identity 'Q=cortico-thalamic oscillation', the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q (viz., M) must be either mental, physical, non-physical, topic-neutral or "direct", in which case there is no metaphysical mode of presentation. The mental proposal is supposed to be useless. The physical proposal is supposed to be ruled out because there is no a priori available physicalistic description of Q, because of supposed regress, and because the metaphysical mode must be "thin". The "direct reference" proposal appears to be ruled out by the fact that the concept of Q needed to get the argument off the ground is a phenomenal concept with a phenomenal metaphysical mode of presentation. So the only proposals for M are non-physical and topic-neutral. The topic-neutral proposal involves a form of deflationism. So the ultimate metaphysical choice according to the Property Dualism Argument is between deflationism and dualism. The upshot is that the phenomenal realist ("inflationist") cannot be a physicalist.
Phenomenal Concepts
In my critique of the Property Dualism Argument I will use a conception of phenomenal concepts that stems from the observation that a token of a phenomenal property can serve in thought to represent that very property. The token can occur, for example, in a memory image, in a percept or in a bodily sensation. In such a case, the phenomenal property does double duty: as part of the concept and also as the referent of that concept. For example, one can think the thought that one could put in words as "This is unpleasant", using a token of the pain itself to link the demonstrative to the pain. Recall that I defined the MMoP as a property of the referent via which the concept picks it out--or the referent itself in some cases in which the referent is itself a property. It is phenomenal concepts that prompted the last clause. In a phenomenal concept, the CMoP contains a token of the phenomenal property that is the referent, and the MMoP is the phenomenal property, i.e. the referent itself. (A phenomenal concept in my sense is close to the notion in Papineau (2002) and to what Chalmers (2002) calls a "pure phenomenal concept". See also Block (2002) .
Note that a phenomenal concept picks out its referent, not via an "aspect" of it, but via the phenomenal property that is the referent itself. Note also that a phenomenal concept in my sense avoids the problem mentioned earlier of a different kind of concept of a phenomenal property, viz., the property whose onset of instantiation here was at 5:00 PM. That concept did not allow the Property Dualism Argument to get off the ground, but my kind of phenomenal concept visibly does.
The role of this conception of phenomenal concepts will become clear later in the discussion of the Property Dualism proposal that MMoPs must be "thin" properties.
Objection: (put to me by Kirk Ludwig): I can truly think "I am not having a red experience now" using a phenomenal concept of that experience, but that would not be possible on your view of what phenomenal concepts are.
Reply: It is hard to imagine how anyone could make that kind of error, but I agree that such a false thought is possible. For example, someone might set himself to think something that is manifestly false, saying to himself "I am not having a red experience now", using a phenomenal concept of the experience. On my account of phenomenal concepts a concept involving a phenomenal quality would be denied to apply to that very phenomenal quality. Strange, but not impossible.
Objection: But it does not make sense to suppose that cortico-thalamic oscillation is its own mode of presentation. At best, an aspect of cortico-thalamic oscillation might be a phenomenal mode of presentation. But then how can it be that Q = cortico-thalamic oscillation and also that Q is its own mode of presentation?
Reply: The objection involves a use/mention error. I agree that it sounds wrong, even bizarrely wrong, to say that cortico-thalamic oscillation is its own MMoP. That makes it sounds as if one is saying that the MMoP associated with the term on the righthand side of the identity statement, 'Q=cortico-thalamic oscillation' is cortico-thalamic oscillation itself rather than some aspect of it, an aspect that involves its detection by measuring instruments, for example, involving the physical properties of oxygen metabolism that feeds the brain. But the claim is not that the right hand side of the identity statement is one in which the referent is its own metaphysical mode of presentation but rather that this is so for the left hand side. Modes of presentation-both cognitive and metaphysical--are modes of presentation associated with terms or the concepts associated with the terms, and the identity involves two terms. Applying these points to the case at hand, Q = cortico-thalamic oscillation. Since Q is its own MMoP, by Leibniz's Law, cortico-thalamic oscillation is its own MMoP. But cortico-thalamic oscillation is its own MMoP only in that cortico-thalamic oscillation is its own MMoP under the concept 'Q'. That is, the term on the left hand side of the identity, 'Q' picks out its referent via an MMoP that is identical to the referent. The term on the right hand side of the identity picks out its referent via a different MMoP, an MMoP that has to do with oxygen metabolism. In sum, cortico-thalamic oscillation is its own MMoP only as picked out by the phenomenal concept of it. 14 14 There is one outstanding issue involving phenomenal concepts that I will raise briefly without attempting to resolve. What makes it the case that a token phenomenal property in a phenomenal concept serves as a token of one phenomenal type or property rather than another. For example, suppose that a token of a mental image of red serves in a phenomenal concept to pick out an experience as of red. Why red rather than scarlet or colored? One answer is an appeal to dispositions. Suppose you are looking at chips in an ideal paint store that has a chip for every distinct color. (Boynton estimates that there would be about a million such chips.) You are looking at Green 126, 731 , thinking that the experience as of that color is nice, using a phenomenal concept of that experience. But what experience is it that your phenomenal concept is of? The experience as of Green 126,731 ? The experience as of green? The answer on the dispositionalist view is that it depends on the subject's disposition to say that another experience is an experience of the same type. If only another experience as of Green 126,731 will count as an experience of the same type, the phenomenal concept is maximally specific; if any bluish green experience will count as an experience of the same type, the concept is more abstract. If any experience of green will count as an experience of the same type, the concept is still more abstract. (Views of this general sort have been defended in conversation by Brian Loar and Kati Balog.)
The line of thought I have been mentioning has a superficial resemblance to a line of response to Kripke introduced into the literature by Richard Boyd (1980). I will critically discuss that line of thought later, explaining why I don't think Boyd's reply to Kripke works and how the thought at I am expressing here does not have the same problem.
Critique of the Property Dualism Argument
The central idea of the Property Dualism Argument (using the identity 'Q = cortico-thalamic oscillation' as an example) is that the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q, viz. M, cannot be physical. I mentioned three arguments to that effect, a regress argument, an argument concerning a priori availability, and an argument based on the thin/thick distinction. I will now say what I think is wrong with those arguments. The exposition of the argument has been long, but the critique will be much shorter. As we will see, the first two arguments do not really stand alone, but require the thin/thick argument. My critique of the thin/thick argument is aimed more at depriving the conclusion of support rather than outright refutation.
Regress
The first argument mentioned earlier against the physical proposal is a regress argument. The idea is that if M is physical, it will not serve to account for cognitive significance. For example, suppose the subject rationally believes that he has Q but not cortico-thalamic oscillation. As noted earlier, there can be rational error in supposing A This sort of view is similar to Berkeley's answer to the question of how an image of an isosceles triangle can be a concept of triangle, a concept that covers non-isosceles triangles as well as isosceles triangles. His answer was: because the image functions so as to apply to all types of triangles rather than just to isosceles triangles.
There is a problem with Berkeley's answer that also applies to the view of phenomenal concepts I am talking about: namely, that it would seem that it is because one is taking the image of an isosceles triangle as a triangle-image rather than as an isosceles-triangle-image that it functions as it does, rather than the other way around. (This is not to impugn the functional role semantics idea that the role is what makes the concept the concept it is; rather, the point is that there is something about the entity that has the role that gives it that role.) Similarly, it is because one is taking the experience of a specific shade of green as a green-experience rather than as a Green 126,731 experience that makes it function as a concept of the experience of green rather than the concept of the specific shade of green. The dispositionalist view seems to get things backwards. However, no view of phenomenal concepts can sign on to the idea that an experience functions in a concept only under another concept, since that would lead to a regress. My tentative thought is that there is a form of "taking" that does not amount to a further concept but is enough to explain the dispositions. But I cannot go into the matter further here.
is present without B when in fact A=B. That error can be explained if there is a metaphysical mode of presentation of A, MMoP A and a metaphysical mode of presentation of B, MMoP B , such that MMoP A is manifest and MMoP B is not, leaving the subject in the epistemic situation that he would be in in a possible world in which MMoP A and MMoP B were modes of presentation of two different items.
Applied to the case at hand, the physicalist thesis that Q= cortico-thalamic oscillation, let us assume that the MMoP of 'cortico-thalamic oscillation' is the one mentioned earlier having to do with oxygen uptake by neural processes that affects a brain scanner. It is the other metaphysical mode of presentation that is problematic, viz., M, the metaphysical mode of presentation of the left hand side of the identity. The Property Dualist says that if M is physical, then M cannot serve to account for cognitive significance, since the subject need have no access to that physical description just in virtue of being the subject of that metaphysical mode of presentation. The problem could be solved if there was a mental mode of presentation of M itself, call it "M*". But this is the first step in a regress in which a metaphysical mode of presentation that is physical is itself presented by a metaphysical mode of presentation that is mental. For the same issue will arise all over again for M* that arose for M. Accounting for the different cognitive significances of the two sides of an identity statement requires two modes of presentation that are available to the first person at some level or other, so postulating a physical metaphysical mode of presentation just takes out an explanatory loan that has to be paid back at the level of modes of presentation of modes of presentation, etc.
This argument is question-begging. The argument supposes that if M is physical, it could not serve to account for cognitive significance, since accounting for cognitive significance requires a mental MMoP. But the physicalist thesis is that M is both mental and physical.
Of course if MMoPs must be thin, then M cannot be both mental and physical. But if that is the claim, the regress argument depends on the "thick/thin" argument to be discussed below, and does not stand on its own. I assumed that the MMoP of 'cortico-thalamic oscillation' is unproblematic, having to do, for example with oxygen absorption by brain activity. But the Property Dualist may say that this MMoP does not uniquely determine the referent and need not be a property to which the subject has given a special reference-fixing authority. (I will use the phrase 'fixes the referent' to mean uniquely determine the referent and has been given the special authority.) Why is this a reply to my point concerning the question-begging nature of the regress argument? I think this response has nothing to do with the regress argument, but it is not irrelevant to the debate. For the question arises: if the regress argument's appeal to cognitive significance requires an MMoP for 'cortico-thalamic oscillation' that does fix the referent, what would that MMoP be? Someone could argue that that MMoP could only be the property being cortico-thalamic oscillation itself. And then it could be claimed that both sides of the identity are such that the MMoP is identical with the referent. And this may be said to lead to dualism via a route that I will describe later. I will take up this argument below under the heading of a "cousin" of the Property Dualism Argument. I will not go into the matter now, except to note that it cannot be assumed that a property of the referent that accounts for cognitive significance also fixes the referent, and what counts in this argument is cognitive significance. As Byrne and Pryor (2004) note, it is easy to see that properties of the referent that account for cognitive significance (play the Frege role, in their terms) need not fix the referent. For example, being a raspy-voiced singer may play the Frege role for 'Bob Dylan', even though there are other raspy-voiced singers. And being a raspy voiced singer need only be a property that the subject saliently associates with the referent, not a property to which the subject has given the special authority.
I expect that some will say that this is not good enough to rationalize error. Let us use the notation RF['Dylan'] to mean the property to which the subject has given the special reference-fixing authority for using 'Dylan'. The view I expect to hear is that to rationalize error, we must ascribe to the subject a justified belief that RF['Bob Dylan'] is instantiated here, but, say RF['Robert Zimmerman'] is not instantiated here. But this is a false picture of what it takes to rationalize error. If I have reason to believe that some property of Bob Dylan is instantiated here but that some property of Robert Zimmerman is not, then other things equal, I have reason to think Dylan and Zimmerman are different people, no matter how unconnected these properties are from reference-fixers.
In sum, the conception of MMoP required to explain rational error is one on which being physical is no bar to the kind of first person authority required to account for cognitive significance.
A priori availability
The second argument presented above was that (to quote White, 1983), "Since there is no physicalistic description that one could plausibly suppose is coreferential a priori with an expression like "Smith's pain at t," no physical property of a pain (i.e., a brain state of type X) could provide the route by which it was picked out by such an expression." (p. 353).
This second argument presupposes that the MMoP in the sense of the property of the referent that provides "the route by which it is picked out" is a priori available to the subject. What is "the route by which it is picked out"? We can avoid this question by being very liberal about the role the MMoP. Consider a case in which the subject conceives of the referent as being the local wet thing. Without going into the question of what a route by which it is picked out is, let us suppose that:
• The property of being the local wet thing is a priori available to the subject on the basis of the CMoP • The property of being the local wet thing uniquely determines the referent • The subject has given this property the special reference-fixing authority just mentioned. But being wet = being at least partially covered or soaked with H 2 O. Must the subject have a priori access to that description or know a priori that the physical description is coreferential with the original description? It is hard to see why a priori availability to the subject or the subject having given the property a special authority should have that consequence. I hereby stipulate that the name 'Albert' is the name of the local wet thing. The property of Albert's being the local wet thing is a priori available to me in virtue of my stipulation, and I have given it a special reference-fixing authority. But I can do all that without knowing all descriptions of that property. That property can be and is physical even though I do not know, and therefore do not have a priori available, its physical description.
Earlier, I considered the idea that MMoPs should be individuated according to CMoPs and thus that the property of being the local wet thing-considered as an MMoPindividuated-according-to-CMoP-is not identical to the property of being covered or soaked with H 2 O. The question then arises of what it is for such properties to be physical and what the physicalist's commitments are with respect to such properties. I believe that this question is best pursued not by inquiring about how to think of such strange entities as MMoPs-individuated-according-to-CMoPs but by focusing on the CMoPs themselves. And a further reason for turning the focus to CMoPs is that although the subject need have no a priori access to the physical descriptions of the physical properties that provide the metaphysical route of access, it may be thought that this is not so for CMoPs. After all, CMoPs are certainly good candidates for a priori access! Let us distinguish two things that might be meant by saying that a CMoP (or MMoP) is physical. First, one might have an ontological thesis in mind-that the CMoP (or MMoP) is identical to a physical entity or property or some conglomeration involving a physical properties or entities. In this sense, a CMoP (or MMoP) can be physical whether or not the subject has a priori access to any physicalistic description of it. (The issue which the Property Dualism Argument is concerned with is whether phenomenal properties are, ontologically speaking, physical properties. I said at the outset that the issue of whether the cognitive, linguistic and semantic apparatus involved in a CMoP is ontologically physical should be put to one side. My rationale, you will recall, is that although there is an important issue as to whether physicalism can handle cognitive, linguistic or semantic entities or properties, in a discussion of whether phenomenal properties are physical, it is best to put these other important issues aside.)
A second interpretation of the claim that a CMoP is physical is that it is explicitly physical or analyzable a priori in physical terms. In this paper, I have been using 'physicalistic' to mean explicitly physical. It makes little sense to say that an MMoP is physicalistic (since it is not a cognitive, linguistic or semantic entity), but it does make sense to say that something that involves conceptual or linguistic or semantic apparatus is physicalistic. For example, the CMoP 'being covered with water' is not physicalistic (at least if we restrict physics to microphysics), whereas 'being covered with H 2 O' is physicalistic.
Is the CMoP of a phenomenal concept physical? Physicalistic? Recall, that according to me, a phenomenal concept uses a (token of a) phenomenal property to pick out that very phenomenal property. Thus the CMoP of a phenomenal concept contains a non-descriptional element: a phenomenal property. And a phenomenal property is certainly not explicitly physical, i.e., physicalistic, that is, it does not contain conceptual apparatus or vocabulary of physics. A phenomenal property is not a bit of conceptual apparatus and it contains no conceptual apparatus. So, focusing on the 'physicalistic' sense of 'physical', the CMoP of a phenomenal concept is not physical. Must the physicalist therefore admit defeat? Hardly, for physicalism is not the doctrine that everything is explicitly physical. Physicalism does not say that all descriptions or conceptual apparatus are couched in physical vocabulary or analyzable a priori in physical vocabulary. Physicalists allow that there are domains of thought other than physics. Physicalists do not say that history and anthropology use physicalistic vocabulary or conceptual apparatus. This is an absurd form of conceptual reductionism that cannot be equated with physicalism.
Physicalism does not require that the CMoP of a phenomenal concept be physicalistic, but it does require that it is (ontologically) physical. Is it physical? That depends on whether linguistic and cognitive apparatus is physical, an issue that assumed to be yes in this paper. So the remaining issue is whether the phenomenal property that is part of the CMoP is physical. And that of course is the very issue of physicalism vs. dualism that this paper is about. The Property Dualism Argument cannot assume that it is not physical-that is what the argument is supposed to show.
Where are we? Here is the dialectic: the Property Dualist says that in order for physicalism to be true, the physical description of the property that provides the route of reference has to be a priori available to the subject; it is not a priori available; so physicalism is false. I pointed out that even on very liberal assumptions about the role of the MMoP, this is not so. But then I imagined a Property Dualist reply that said that I had failed to individuate the MMoP according to the CMoP. I then suggested that we eliminate the middleman, looking at the CMoP itself instead of considering the MMoPindividuated-according-to-the-CMoP. I pointed out that there is a sense of 'non-physical' (namely non-physicalistic) in which the CMoP of a phenomenal concept is non-physical. I noted however that physicalists are not committed to all language or conceptual apparatus being physicalistic. Physicalists are committed to ontological physicalism, not conceptual reductionism. Thus the assumption of the second argument (viz., the topic of this section, the a priori availability argument) that the physicalist requires an a priori available description of the MMoP of the mental side of the mind-body identity is problematic.
If MMoPs have to be thin, then perhaps the distinction between an MMoP being ontologically physical and explicitly physical does not come to as much as might seem. Since a thin physical property has no hidden essence, it might be said to wear its physicality on its sleeve. However, if this is the only way to save the argument from a priori availability, that argument does not stand on its own but depends on the thin/thick argument, to which we now turn.
But first a brief reminder of what has been presupposed so far about the nature of MMoPs and CMoPs. In rebutting the regress argument, I assumed, along with the argument itself, that the purpose of MMoPs is to account for cognitive significance. The issue arose as to whether an MMoP defined according to its explanatory purpose must also fix reference or determine the referent. I argued not. The issue of the nature of CMoPs did not arise. In rebutting the second argument, I did not make any assumption about MMoPs or CMoPs that should be controversial, allowing a priori availability of the MMoP on the basis of the CMoP, reference-fixing authority and determination of the referent.
Thin/Thick
The third argument that the MMoP of a phenomenal concept cannot be physical involves the distinction mentioned between "thin" and "thick" properties (from some unpublished papers by White). As we have seen above, the first two parts of the Property Dualism Argument hinge on the thin/thick argument. Whether a property is thick or thin is a matter of whether it has a hidden essence.
15 For example, water or the property of being water is thick, since our concept of water is a concept of something that has a scientific nature that goes beyond superficial manifestations of it. 16 Examples of thin properties are mathematical properties, at least some functional properties, and phenomenal properties if dualism is true. (The last point about dualism could be challenged-see Nagel (2001)--but I will put the issue aside.) Artifact properties such as being a telephone might also be taken by some to be thin. Some natural kind properties may be said to be thin, or perhaps it is indeterminate whether they are thin. For example, it may be said that it is not a determinate matter whether there can be a twin earth case for 'electron'. (More on this issue later.)
Why believe that MMoPs must be thin? I will start with two arguments. First, the Aspect Argument. According to the Aspect Argument, the explanatory purpose of MMoPs precludes thick properties serving as modes of presentation. For, as mentioned earlier, the Property Dualist says that it is not all of a thick property that explains rational error but only an aspect of it, the thin aspect.
Another argument for thin MMoPs is the A Priority Argument, which appeals to the idea mentioned earlier that there is an a priori relation between CMoPs and MMoPs: the MMoP is a priori available on the basis of the CMoP. Note that it is not necessary for the Property Dualist to claim that all MMoPs are thin or a priori available on the basis of CMoPs; it would be enough if this were true for phenomenal concepts.
15 White mentions some other ways of defining the thick/thin distinction. I can't commit him to any particular formulation, but the rough idea of one of these is that a property is thin if and only if the predicate that canonically expresses it is fully intentionalized in the sense that. no empirical information about the reference of the predicate in the actual world (other than what is needed to understand the predicate) is needed to determine its extension in a possible world. 16 We might think of a thick concept (as contrasted with a thick property) as one that purports to pick out a hidden essence.
These two reasons for MMoPs (at least for phenomenal concepts) being thin appeal to different features of MMoPs and their relations to CMoPs. The first appeals to the explanatory role of MMoPs, whereas the second appeals to an a priori relation between CMoPs and MMoPs. Although I have registered doubt as to whether the same entities can serve both functions, I will put that doubt aside.
Let us start with the Aspect Argument. As mentioned, the idea is that it is not all of a thick property that explains rational error but only an aspect of it, the aspect that is available a priori on the basis of the CMoP. But on the face of it, that aspect can itself be thick. Consider the example of Albert, which I pick out on the basis of its being the local wet thing. Albert's property of being the local wet thing fixes reference, uniquely determines the referent, is a priori available and also thick.
The Property Dualist may say that the property that would serve in explanations of error is not that it is wet but that it looks wet. However, consider a non-perceptual case: I infer using inductive principles that something in the corner is wet, and pick it out via its property of being wet. In this case, the substitution is unmotivated. The MMoP just does not seem perceptual. Nor artifactual, nor, more generally, functional. On the face of it, the MMoP is a thick property, the property of being wet, i.e. (roughly) at least partially covered or soaked with water (which is thick because being covered with water is being covered with H 2 O).
I say that the aspect of a property that accounts for cognitive significance can itself be thick, appealing to examples. But the Property Dualist may suppose that if we attend to the mental contents that are doing the explaining, we can see that they are narrow contents, contents that are shared by Putnamian twins (people who are the same in non-relational properties inside the skin). If the relevant explanatory contents are narrow contents, then the corresponding explanatory content properties-MMoPs-will be thin. I suspect that this is the main argument for the view of MMoPs as thin. I cannot refute it, but what I hope to show is that without such an argument, the postulation of thin MMoPs is unmotivated and implausible. I have just rebutted one of the two arguments for thin MMoPs. I will next rebut the other one. Then I will argue that thin MMoPs are independently implausible. Then I will move to the narrow content argument.
Turning to the A Priority Argument, I have gestured at a conception of phenomenal concepts in which both the CMoP and the MMoP involve a phenomenal property-indeed the same phenomenal property. Since the same phenomenal property is involved in both the CMoP and the MMoP, it is hard to see why there ought to be a problem about the a priori availability of the MMoP on the basis of the CMoP even if that phenomenal property is ontologically physical. Even if one supposes that a thick MMoP cannot be available a priori on the basis of a purely descriptive CMoP, that reasoning would not apply to a CMoP that is not purely descriptive and contains the very same thick property. The burden of proof is on the Property Dualist to show why the presence of the same phenomenal property in both the CMoP and the MMoP is not enough for the supposed a priori relation or to argue against the account of phenomenal concepts given earlier.
I have rebutted the Aspect and A Priority Arguments, arguments for the conclusion that MMoPs of phenomenal concepts must be thin, but one can also look at the thesis itself independently of the arguments for it. Here are three considerations about the thesis itself, in increasing order of importance.
1. The assumption of thin MMoPs is sufficient for the conclusion of the Property Dualism Argument all by itself. For what are the candidates for a thin MMoP for a phenomenal concept? Artifact properties like being a telephone (even assuming that they are thin) and purely mathematical properties are non-starters. It is not clear whether there are any natural kind terms that express thin properties. It is pretty easy to come up with twin earth cases for many physical terms. For example, a counterfactual world in which everything is made of anti-matter would serve to motivate twin earth cases for terms such as 'hydrogen' or 'electron'.
(The twin-Earthers call anti-hydrogen and anti-electrons 'hydrogen' and 'electron'. Of course these twin-Earthers would be themselves made of antimatter, but that doesn't stop their brains from being relevantly like ours.) Even if there are fundamental physical properties that are thin, the Property Dualist can hardly suggest fundamental physical properties as candidates for MMoPs for phenomenal concepts, since that would be incompatible with the conclusion of the Property Dualist's argument. It would seem that the only remotely plausible candidates for thin MMoPs by which phenomenal concepts refer are (1) functional properties, in which case deflationism would be true, and (2) phenomenal properties that are non-physical, in which case dualism is true. The upshot would be the same as the conclusion of the Property Dualism Argument itself: that inflationist physicalism is untenable. So the Property Dualist cannot just assume thin MMoPs for phenomenal concepts.
2. I doubt whether any of our ordinary concepts other than mathematical or purely functional concepts are concepts of thin properties. Phenomenal concepts would be concepts of thin properties if a certain kind of dualism is true, but that cannot be presupposed in an argument for dualism. I doubt that any artifact concepts of natural language are thin. Hilary Putnam once noted that we can imagine a scenario in which we find out that cats are robot spies from Mars. (In terms of Davies and Humberstone's notion of a world conceived as actual, there is a world conceived as actual in which cats are robot spies from Mars. See also Chalmers 1996.) A kind of converse case was suggested by Rogers Albritton (in conversation): that we could find out that pencils are living creatures which surreptitiously eat, reproduce, excrete, etc. So our concept of a pencil allows that we could find out that pencils are not artifacts after all. What the example suggests is that so-called "artifact" concepts of natural language have a natural kind element, and so it is not clear that they are thin.
Artifact concepts and phenomenal concepts are the leading candidates for concepts of thin properties. But we can approach the issue in a less piecemeal fashion, asking what it is about a concept that makes it thick or thin. I defined the thick/thin distinction in terms of hidden essences, but it is hard to see why a social dimension should not also come in. If the reason for excluding hidden essences from MMoPs is that they are supposed not to be a priori available on the basis of CMoPs, wouldn't this rationale apply equally well (or equally badly) to the social dimension of properties? As Burge (19--) has forcefully argued, all or most concepts that are not concepts of hidden essences (as well as those that are) are externalist. For example, the concept of red expressed by a person in a language community depends on the boundaries of shades in that language community. The upshot is that the property of redness that we talk about using that concept has a social dimension, which is just as plausibly (or implausibly) unavailable a priori as the hidden essence of natural kinds. The purpose of the thick/thin distinction indicates that the definition of 'thick' should say that thick concepts (concepts of thick properties) are externalist concepts. But then all of our ordinary concepts (other than mathematical and purely functional concepts) are thick concepts. Mathematical properties are non-starters for MMoPs. So it looks like the only candidates for phenomenal MMoPs would be properties we don't have ordinary concepts of-ignoring purely functional properties and phenomenal properties dualistically conceived. The upshot is that once again we see the assumption of thin MMoPs leads to functional MMoPs, i.e. deflationism, or to phenomenal MMoPs dualistically conceived, i.e. dualism. Again, the assumption of thin MMoPs leads to the conclusion of the Property Dualism Argument itself.
3. So far, I have argued that the assumption of thin MMoPs leads to dualism or deflationism. But actually I doubt that deflationism really is an option. Let me explain. The functionalist characterizes functional properties in terms of the "Ramsey sentence" for a theory. Supposing that 'yellow teeth' is an "observation term", the Ramsey sentence for the theory that smoking causes cancer and yellow teeth is ∃F 1 ∃F 2 [F 1 causes F 2 and yellow teeth], i.e. there are two properties one of which causes the other and yellow teeth. Focusing on psychological theories, where the "observation terms" (or "old" terms in Lewis' parlance) are terms for inputs and outputs, the Ramsey sentence could be put as follow:
The 'i' terms are input terms and the 'o' terms are output terms. Functional properties of the sort that can be defined in terms of the Ramsey sentence are properties that consist in having certain other properties that have certain causal relations to inputs, outputs and other properties. 17 The inputs and outputs can be characterized in many ways. For example, an output might be characterized neurally, or in terms of movements of a hand or leg, or distally, in terms of, e.g. water in the distance, or distally and mentalistically in terms of drinking water. But all of these characterizations are plausibly thick, not thin. Perhaps you will think that some of them are themselves 17 More specifically the functional definitions work as follows. If 'F 17 ' is the variable that replaced 'pain', 'pain' could be defined as follows: pain = the property of being an x such that ∃F 1 ….∃F n [T(F 1 …F n , i 1 …i m , o 1 …o p ) and x has F 17 ].
functional, but then the issue I am raising would arise for the input and output specification of those functional properties. Since the problem I am raising depends on the thickness of the input and output properties, I put those terms for those properties, ('i 1 '…'i m ', 'o 1 '…'o p '), in bold in the Ramsey sentence earlier.
The only functional properties I know of that are plausibly thin are purely formal functional properties that abstract from the specific nature of inputs and outputs, the kind of functional property that could be shared by a person and an economy. (See Block, 1978.) For example, in the case of the theory that smoking causes cancer and yellow teeth a purely formal Ramsey sentence would be '∃F 1 ∃F 2 ∃F 3 [F 1 causes F 2 and F 3 ]', which says that there are three properties one of which causes the other two. A property definable in terms of this Ramsey sentence could be shared by a person and an economy.
To sum up: The "aspect" rationale for MMoPs being thin seems doubtful because the aspect can itself be thick. And the rationale for thin MMoPs in terms of the supposed a priori relation between CMoP and MMoP is problematic because the key phenomenal feature of the MMoP is also present in the CMoP, when the relevant concept is phenomenal. At least this is so on one plausible notion of phenomenal concepts, which the Property Dualist would have to challenge. Moving to the thesis itself independently of arguments for it, the assumption of thin MMoPs amounts to much the same thing as the Property Dualism Argument itself. Further, the only remotely plausible candidates for thin MMoPs are purely formal properties that we do not have ordinary concepts of and phenomenal properties, dualistically conceived. The purely formal properties though more plausible than some other candidates, are not very plausible, even from a deflationist point of view. Deflationist functionalism is based on analyses of mentality in terms of sensory input and behavioral output. Purely formal properties do not adequately capture such analyses, and cannot without thick input and output terms. So that lands the proponent of the thin/thick version of the Property Dualism Argument with the assumption of dualism itself.
There is one more consideration to come having to do with the thin/thick argument, the consideration mentioned above having to do with narrow content. Perhaps it should be considered to be the main basis for the claim that MMoPs for phenomenal concepts are thin. Here is an argument--based on the claim that CMoPs must be narrow contents--to the effect that MMoPs must be thin. I offer it in the voice of the Property Dualist:
Suppose my CMoP is "that wet thing in the corner" (in a non-perceptual case) and my twin on Putnam's twin earth would put his CMoP in the same words. Still, the difference between what he means by 'wet' and what I mean by 'wet' cannot matter to the rationalizing explanatory force of the CMoPs. And since CMoPs are to be individuated entirely by explanatory force, my twin and I have the same CMoPs: viz., the CMoPs are narrow. But since there is an a priori relation between CMoP and MMoP, the MMoPs must be thin. Narrow CMoP, therefore thin MMoP.
The argument presupposes the familiar but controversial idea that only narrow content can serve in intentional explanations. However, on the face of it, my 'water'-concept explains my drinking water but would not explain my drinking 19xx and Burge, 19xx.) . The idea that only narrow contents can rationalize is certainly controversial. I cannot enter this dispute here, and so the issue between me and the Property Dualist will have to remain to that extent unresolved.
However, there is another problem with the reasoning in the voice of the Property Dualist. The inference from narrow content/narrow CMoP to thin MMoP has some initial plausibilty. But this inference is not valid, as one can see from the special case of phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts make for narrow phenomenal contents. The phenomenal way of picking out an experiential property depends only on nonrelational features of the person, and so the CMoP is narrow. However, it does not follow that the MMoP is thin. If physicalism is true, the MMoP has a hidden physical essence and therefore is not thin. To suppose that the inference from narrow CMoP to thin MMoP is valid is simply to beg the question against the physicalist. This point is illuminated by looking at the anomalous nature of phenomenal concepts with respect to Twin Earth thought experiments. Are phenomenal concepts of the sort that I have advocated natural kind concepts of the sort discussed by Putnam, Kripke and Burge? Yes and no. They are natural kind concepts in one respect: they purport to pick out objective kinds, and if the physicalist is right, those kinds have scientific natures that cannot be grasped a priori simply on the basis of having the concept. But they differ from natural kind concepts in that the Twin Earth mode of thought experiment does not apply. The Twin Earth mode of thought experiment involves a pair of people who are the same in non-relational physical properties but with a crucial physical difference in their respective worlds or counterfactual situations. In Putnam's classic version, twins who are the same in non-relational physical properties pick out substances using 'water' that have physically different natures, and (so it is claimed), the meanings of their 'water' terms and 'water'-thought contents differ. They are physically the same, but mentally different.
But how is the Twin Earth thought experiment supposed to be applied to phenomenality? The twins cannot be the same in non-relational physical properties and also differ in the physical natures of their phenomenal states! So there is no straightforward way to apply the Twin Earth thought experiment to phenomenal concepts.
It may be said that what the Putnamian thought experiment really depends on is that the "twins" be relevantly the same in the non-relational aspect of certain concepts, although different in some relevant physical feature. The idea would be that the Putnamian "twins" are alike in non-relational features of their 'water' concepts, but the physical difference in the environment makes their 'water'-concepts differ overall. The application to the case of phenomenality would be to keep non-relational features of phenomenal concepts the same between "twins", allowing the physical basis of phenomenality to differ. But this makes no more sense from the physicalist viewpoint than the suggestion of the last paragraph, at least on the view of phenomenal concepts that I have been suggesting, for if the non-relational aspect of phenomenal concepts are the same, then any putative difference in physical basis of phenomenality just shows that the real physical basis has been misdescribed. It would have to be disjunctive or in some other way higher order: for the shared phenomenality has to be explained by a shared physical property.
The upshot is that from the point of view of Putnamian considerations, phenomenal concepts are an anomaly. They are natural kind concepts in that they allow for objective natures that are "hidden" in the sense of not being a priori available on the basis of merely having the concept, but they are not natural kind concepts in that no Putnamian or Burgean "Twin Earth" scenario is possible. Applying this point about the anomalousness of phenomenal concepts to the consideration at hand, phenomenal concepts have narrow contents without involving thick properties. That is, the CMoPs are narrow even though the corresponding MMoPs are thick. Indeed, the CMoPs themselves are both narrow and thick. Narrow because non-relational, thick because they involve a phenomenal element that has a hidden scientific nature.
To sum up, the Property Dualism Argument says that in the identity 'Q=cortico-thalamic oscillation', the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q must be either mental, physical, non-physical, topic-neutral or "direct", in which case there is no metaphysical mode of presentation. The mental proposal is supposed to be useless. The physical proposal is supposed to be ruled out because there is no a priori available physicalistic description of Q, because of a supposed regress, and because MMoPs in general or at least the relevant one (M) are supposed to be "thin". The "no MMoP" proposal appears to be ruled out by the fact that the concept of Q needed to get the argument off the ground is a phenomenal concept with a phenomenal metaphysical mode of presentation. So the only remaining options are the non-physical and topic-neutral proposals. The topicneutral proposal involves a form of deflationism. So the phenomenal realist ("inflationist") cannot be a physicalist. I have argued that both the mental and physical proposals are fine. In addition, my way out involves a notion of a phenomenal concept that has some affinities with the "directness" story in which there is no metaphysical mode of presentation at all, since my phenomenal MMoPs are identical to or at least overlap significantly with the referent itself. Finally, I considered a family of arguments based on the idea that MMoPs must be thin, arguing that appeal to narrow content does nothing to establish thinness. According to me, phenomenal concepts are both narrow and thick.
Although I expressed skepticism about whether any one thing can explain rational error, fix reference and be a priori available, this skepticism has not played a role in these arguments except at one point at which I noted that an explanatory MMoP need not fix the referent or uniquely determine the referent. The other rebuttals were keyed to one or another version of MMoPs and CMoPs and their relation.
Note that I haven't argued that the MMoPs for phenomenal concepts cannot be thin. Rather, my point is that the support for this idea depends on implausible claims and that the view itself is problematic. The upshot is that it is up to the Property Dualist to justify the claim that MMoPs for phenomenal concepts are thin.
#Aspects Again
As I mentioned earlier, the Property Dualist says that it is not all of a thick property that explains rational error but only an aspect of it, the thin aspect. I said that that aspect can itself be thick, but this reply may seem to sidestep the real significance of the point. The Property Dualist may say something like this:
If phenomenal property Q is a physical property, then it can be picked out by a physical-say neurological-concept that identifies it in neurological terms. But those neurological identifications are irrelevant to first person phenomenal identifications, showing that the first person phenomenal identification depends on one aspect of the phenomenal property-its "feel"-rather than another aspect-its neurologically identifying parameters. That is, since the effect of cortico-thalamic oscillation on instruments is not part of the first person route by which we pick it out, it follows that not every aspect of the physical property is relevant to the first person route. Therefore the identity 'Q = cortico-thalamic oscillation' is one in which the terms pick out a single referent via different properties of it, different MMoPs. And so the Property Dualism Argument has not been avoided.
The physicalist point of view does not disagree with the objector about the terms of the identity involving reference to Q via different properties of it. The MMoP of 'Q' is ontologically physical (and neurological) but it is nonetheless distinct from the physical MMoP of 'cortico-thalamic oscillation'. The former MMoP is or involves corticothalamic oscillation itself, whereas the latter has to do with the oxygen uptake that we use to detect cortico-thalamic oscillation. Once we put that issue aside, we can see clearly what is wrong with the objection if we attend to the explicit/ontological distinction. It is true that no physical property is explicitly part of the route of reference of 'Q'. But the route of reference of 'Q', being mental, is ontologically physical-according to physicalism. If the MMoP of 'Q' is, as I have suggested, Q itself, then ontologically, the MMoP of Q is identical to cortico-thalamic oscillation. But the MMoP of 'corticothalamic oscillation' is not cortico-thalamic oscillation itself, but rather something to do with differential oxygen uptake.
On the physicalist view, the feel and the neurological state are not different aspects of one thing: they are literally identical. If they are aspects, they are identical aspects 18 It is true that no neurological property is explicitly part of the first person route, but that does not show that it is not part of the first person route, albeit ontologically rather than explicitly.
A Cousin of the Property Dualism Argument
Saul Kripke (19xx) argued for dualism as follows. Identities are necessary. But cases of mind without brain and brain without mind are possible, so mind-brain identity is not necessary, and therefore not true. The physicalist response is that there is an illusion of contingency involving the mind-body relation. Most of the discussion has focused on the mental side of the identity statement, but Richard Boyd (1980) noted that one way for a physicalist to explain the illusion of contingency of 'Q=cortico-thalamic oscillation' would be to exploit the gap between cortico-thalamic oscillation and its mode of presentation. When we appear to be conceiving of Q without the appropriate corticothalamic oscillation (e.g. a disembodied mind or a version of spectrum inversion), all we are conceiving is Q in a situation in which the instrumentation fails to detect the appropriate cortico-thalamic oscillation, so the physicalist is free to insist that corticothalamic oscillation is part of what one conceives in conceiving of Q, albeit not explicitly. And in conceiving of zombies, all we are conceiving of is the lack of Q and the mistaken appearance of cortico-thalamic oscillation. But if the sole ground for believing in implicit commitment to failing brain measurement devices in these thought experiments is that it avoids the non-physicalist conclusion, the point is pretty weak. The conceivability of zombies, inverted spectra, disembodied minds, etc. does not seem on the surface to depend on implicit conceiving of malfunctioning apparatus. For example, it would seem that one could conceive of the brain and its cortico-thalamic oscillation without conceiving of any particular apparatus for measuring cortico-thalamic oscillation. This line of opposition to Boyd's argument can lead one to neglect the gap between corticothalamic oscillation and its mode of presentation (as if cortico-thalamic oscillation were its own mode of presentation), producing an argument very different from both the Property Dualism Argument and Kripke's argument for dualism. I will briefly present the argument here, but I cannot discuss it at length.
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Consider a mind-body identity claim in which both terms-not just the mental term--have MMoPs that are identical to the referent. According to McGinn (2002) , this would be true for a standard physicalist identity claim, of the sort discussed so far in this paper. Is cortico-thalamic oscillation or potassium ion flow across a membrane its own metaphysical mode of presentation? That depends on what a metaphysical mode of presentation is supposed to be, and that depends on the purpose we have for them. I have mentioned a number of different conceptions of MMoPs, explanatory, referential, a priori graspability. Without going into the matter in any detail, let me just say that I don't see that on any of these conceptions of an MMoP is it plausible that the MMoP of potassium ion flow is potassium ion flow itself.
But there is a kind of mind body identity in which the physical term does more plausibly have an MMoP that is identical to the referent, namely a mental-functional identity claim. What is our access to the property of being caused by A and causing B if not that property itself: being caused by A and causing B? The way we typically fix reference to a functional property is via the functional property itself. And if anything about a functional property is a priori graspable on the basis of a typical concept of it, it would seem to be the functional property itself. This is admittedly not much of an argument, but let us forge ahead, thinking of the MMoP of a functional property as the functional property itself. To make the identity plausibly empirical, let us think of the physical side as a psychofunctional property (see Block, 1978 , where this term was introduced), that is, a functional property that embeds detailed empirical information that can only be discovered empirically. For example, we can take the functional definition to include the Weber-Fechner law. To remind us that we are taking the right hand side of the identity to be a psychofunctional property, let us represent it as 'PF'.
Let our sample mind-body identity be 'Q=PF', where as before, 'Q' denotes a phenomenal property. As before, let us use 'M' for the metaphysical mode of presentation of Q, and let us assume something I suggested but didn't really argue for, that M=Q. Ex hypothesi, the metaphysical mode of presentation of PF is PF itself. But since M=Q, Q= PF and PF = its own metaphysical mode of presentation, it follows that M = the metaphysical mode of presentation of PF, and so the MMoPs of both sides are the same. (See Figure 1 below. ) But if the MMoPs of both sides are the same, then, supposedly, the identity cannot be a posteriori. And that would show that the original a posteriori identity claim cannot be true: psychofunctionalism is, it may seem, refuted. The upshot would be that if we want a functionalist mind-body identity thesis, it can only be a priori (in which case deflationism holds). Or if we reject deflationism, the upshot for the functionalist is dualism. So the conclusion is the same as that of the Property Dualism Argument, but restricted to functionalist mind-body identity claims: for the functionalist, only dualism and deflationism are viable-no inflationist physicalist option works. We could call this the Semantic A priority Argument for Dualism since it depends on the thesis that identities of modes of presentation determine a priority. e. the two metaphysical modes of presentation are the same, and if they are the same, the identity is supposed to be a priori. But since it is not a priori, the argument concludes, it is not true.
The same argument works as well or as badly if instead of the apparatus of modes of presentation we used the primary intension/secondary intension apparatus (Chalmers, 1996) . The idea would be that for phenomenal and functional concepts, the primary intension is identical to the secondary intension. (Both views are endorsed by Chalmers.) So if the secondary intension of a phenomenal/functional identity claim is true, so is the primary intension, and hence a phenomenal/functional identity claim is if true, a priori true. And since for reasons just given it is not a priori true, it is false.
I have a number of objections to this argument. Firstly, the proponent of the argument would have to do more work to convince anyone that in the case of functional properties, the metaphysical mode of presentation is the same as the referent. (And of course, the same is true in spades for McGinn's version of the argument.) Secondly and much more significantly, what determines a priority is much more plausibly sameness of CMoPs rather than sameness of MMoPs. To use an example mentioned earlier, suppose the thing in the corner covered with water = the thing in the corner covered with H 2 O. The CMoP associated with the left hand side is the (interpreted) description 'the thing in the corner covered with water', and the corresponding MMoP is the property of being the thing in the corner covered with water. Similarly for the right hand side. But the property of being the thing in the corner covered with water = the property of being the thing in the corner covered with H 2 O. MMoP 1 =MMoP 2 , but it is not a priori that the thing in the corner covered with water = the thing in the corner covered with H2O.
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I have another response that depends on issues that cannot be explored here. But I will mention it briefly. A priority is not a semantic phenomenon and does not have semantic sufficient conditions. It is not enough for an identity to be a priori for the symbols flanking the identity sign to have the same total semantic values, even the same CMoPs, unless something epistemic is built into semantic value. In particular, if 'A' has the same meaning as 'B', it does not follow that 'A=B' is a priori, for what is required for a priority is that the subject have a priori access to that identity of meaning. For example, anyone who asserts '5=5' will typically have a priori access to the semantic identity in virtue of simply intending the two occurrences of '5' to have the same semantic value. We regard the statement or proposition as a priori in virtue of the identity of semantic values, but this judgment leaves out a step. In general, it is a category mistake to regard propositions as a priori; rather what is a priori is our grasp of them. In many contexts, this slide makes no difference but in the case of the psycho-functional identity, the identity of semantic values, if there is one, is not a priori available to us and so it does make a difference.
I said that the same semantic value on both sides of the identity is not enough for a priority unless something epistemic is built in. But perhaps we should think of these semantic values as having something epistemic built in. The purpose of postulating modes of presentation in the first place is to explain rational error and perhaps the best way to do that is to build in something epistemic. In my view, the epistemic purpose of postulating modes of presentation should be thought of as a reason to choose properties that are epistemically relevant rather than to get epistemic relevance on the cheap by building it in. Further, it remains to be seen whether the kind of epistemic relevance that some may wish to build in is suitable to make the identity a priori.
I remind the reader that the first two considerations are sufficient to cast serious doubt on the argument. In any case, the issue of this section is not the Property Dualism Argument but a related argument, one which deserves its own detailed treatment. Even if, contrary to what I have said, this is a good argument against a psychofunctionalist identity thesis, it does not back up the Property Dualism Argument against a much more general version of physicalism.
The Relation between the Property Dualism Argument and other Arguments for Dualism. Loar (1997) locates the flaw in Jackson's "Mary" argument and Kripke's modal argument in a certain principle (the "semantic premise") and Loar (1999) extends this analysis to Chalmers' and Jackson's modal arguments. (White, forthcoming, argues for a weakened version of the semantic premise and for its relevance to the Property Dualism Argument.) The semantic premise says (in my terminology) that if a statement of property identity is a posteriori, then at least one of MMoPs must be contingently associated with the referent. The idea behind the principle is that if the two concepts pick out a property non-contingently, it must be possible for a thinker who grasps the concepts to see, a priori, that they pick out the same property. This idea proposes a link between the metaphysical and the epistemic: a certain metaphysical status of the mode of reference requires a certain epistemic status of the identity statement.
I agree with Loar that the semantic premise is false, at least if we think of MMoPs as geared to cognitive significance, but I think its falsity has little to do with the Property Dualism Argument or with the Kripke-Chalmers-Jackson argument. To see the falsity, note that the person formed by a certain sperm = the person formed by a certain egg. This identity is a posteriori, yet both terms pick out their referents via essential and therefore necessary properties of it, assuming that Kripke is right about the necessity of origins. Call the sperm and egg that formed George W. Bush 'Gamete-Herbert' and 'Gamete-Barbara' respectively. The person formed from Gamete-Herbert = the person formed from Gamete-Barbara. "The person formed from Gamete-Herbert" does not pick out George W. contingently, nor does "The person formed from Gamete-Barbara", yet one could explain rational error in the normal way. . (My example is put in terms of individuals but it is easy to see how to frame a version of it in terms of properties.) Someone could believe rationally that Gamete-Herbert formed one person and GameteBarbara formed another. Even if Kripke is wrong about the necessity of origins, the logic of the example remains. One thing can have more than one necessary but insufficient property, neither of which a priori entails the other. Thus the terms in a true a posteriori identity can pick out that thing, each term referring by a different necessary property as the MMoP.
Of course there is some contingency in the vicinity. Gamete-Herbert might have joined with an egg other than Gamete-Barbara or Gamete-Barbara might have joined with a sperm other than Gamete-Herbert. And this might suggest a modification of the principle (one that is discussed by White), viz. if a statement of property identity is a posteriori, then it is not the case that both terms refer via MMoPs that are necessary and sufficient conditions for the property that is the referent. Or, more minimally, if a property identity is a posteriori, then it is not the case that one term refers via a sufficient property of it and the other refers via a necessary property of it. But a modification of my example (contributed by John Hawthorne) suggests that neither of these will quite do. Let the identity be: the actual person formed from Gamete-Herbert = the actual person formed from Gamete-Barbara. Arguably, each designator refers via a property that is both necessary and sufficient for the referent.
The reference of the terms 'Gamete-Herbert' and 'Gamete-Barbara' need not be fixed via properties that involve George Bush. The gametes can be identified independently, for example before George Bush was conceived. But plausibly the names will pick them out via some contingent reference-fixing property, e.g. a perceptual demonstrative ("that egg") or by description. And that suggests a beefed up form of the semantic premise that says that there must be contingency either in the relation between MMoPs and referent or in the relation between MMoPs and the MMoPs of the MMoPs, or…And that is what White (forthcoming) suggests as a modification of the semantic premise. I don't know whether this claim is true or not, but in any case I don't think it is a premise in the Property Dualism Argument. It seems more closely related to the Semantic A Priority Argument just discussed.
Kripke, Chalmers and Jackson's modal arguments for dualism.
Many philosophers think Kripke's argument for dualism and the Property Dualism Argument are just variants of one argument. For example, Levine (2001, p. 39, p. 47) says that Kripke's argument for dualism "comes to the same thing in the end" (p. 47) as the Property Dualism Argument. And Chalmers (2002, footnote 19) gives an argument whose key idea is that if a zombie is conceivable, it is possible, saying the following: ""The argument can also be seen as a way of formalizing a version of the "dual property" objection attributed to Max Black by Smart 1959, and developed by Jackson 1979 and White 1986.
The idea of Kripke's, Chalmers' and Jackson's modal arguments for dualism (the "Mary" argument is not modal) is that we can conceive of phenomenal properties without the corresponding brain states and the brain states without the appropriate phenomenal properties. If these scenarios are genuine possibilities, genuine possible worlds, by a familiar form of argument, phenomenal properties cannot be identical to physical properties. I see the physicalist response as one of resisting the move from conceivability to possibility, or more concessively, the physicalist says: whatever kind of possibility it is that zombies and disembodied minds have, it is not the kind that defeats mind-body identity.
These arguments obviously inhabit the same territory and make use of much the same conceptual apparatus. Arguments that one person sees as very similar can be seen by someone else as very different. Splitters and lumpers need not disagree on any actual fact. One way to try to quantify similarity and difference of arguments that are problematic is by similarity and difference of what is problematic about them. This is not a totally objective matter either since a problem in a problematic argument can often appear one way in one argumentative context and another way in another context. Still, it is worth pointing out, I think, that some of the arguments mentioned here are problematic in different ways, at least if my views are right. The Property Dualism Argument depends most centrally on the "thinness" of metaphysical modes of presentation, or so I argued. The Kripke-Chalmers-Jackson modal arguments depend on the relation between conceivability and possibility. (Chalmers (1996) argues that externalism poses no problem for his claims.) Jackson's Knowledge Argument depends on whether what Mary learns can be characterized as a new conceptualization of an old fact. The problems of the argument concerned with Loar's and White's "semantic premise" has more to do with functionalism than physicalism, though its concern with modes of presentation make it more similarity to the Property Dualism Argument than the other two just mentioned.. The Semantic Apriority Argument given above is also concerned with modes of presentation, but as I argued above, the key issue is whether necessary relations among modes of presentation makes for a priority.
I have argued that the Property Dualism Argument depends on implausible ideas, but I have not claimed to conclusively refute it.
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